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RFID-enabled item-level product information Revelation / Wei Zhou ; Gaurav Kapoor ; Selwyn Piramuthu

Article

ZHOU, Wei - Professeur à ESCP Business School. Author | KAPOOR, Gaurav | PIRAMUTHU, Selwyn

We consider a homogeneous product market and the incentive for oligopolists to share item-level product information with their customers. Enabled by Radio Frequency Identification technology, each firm has the option to record and reveal item-level information of a proportion of its products. We consider a two-stage game where each firm first decides its production plan and then determines its level of information revelation. With a constant clearance discount rate, we derive pure strategy equilibria that are subgame perfect and

See the journal "EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS - EJIS"

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